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Abstract: One of the main discussions surrounding the evolution of decentralised agencies in 
the European Union deals with questions of autonomy. This thesis fulfils two purposes: first, 
it searches for empirical evidence for the claim that EU agencies develop a de-facto autonomy 
independently from their formal autonomy and institutional design. Second, it tries to explain 
the development of different levels of informal autonomy between decentralised agencies. 
Based on four case studies ranging over a decade of agency development, the paper discusses 
the factors influencing informal autonomy: conflicts between the agencies’ multiple principles 
or network and reputation building efforts by the agencies’ directors? To achieve this aim, the 
paper draws on EU documents, as well as interviews with officials in institutions, member 
states and agencies. In the end it seems that an agency’s level of autonomy is a result of 
lobbying and reputation building by its Executive Director, influencing in turn the relations 
between the principals both in- and outside the agency’s management board. However, these 
dynamics are also influenced by external events, such as the financial and economic crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the moment, there are more than thirty EU agencies, including around 7000 administrative 
posts and administering a budget of more than 1.5 billion Euros (Levi-Faur 2011). In the EU, 
the number of agencies has increased in two waves of ‘agencification’ during the beginning to 
mid 1990s and from the beginning of the 2000s until the present. Most of the academic 
literature on EU agencies focuses on explanations for their establishment and institutional 
design. Authors attempt to explain the differences in agencies’ powers of decision, where 
some (regulatory) agencies can take decisions, albeit in individual cases, whereas other 
(information, coordination) agencies can ‘merely’ advise and support the EU institutions and 
its Member States (e.g. Majone 1997, Trondal & Jeppesen 2008, Heidbreder 2011). However, 
the majority of these approaches only take the formal institutional set-up into account at the 
moment of establishment of the agency. On the other hand, over the last years, researchers 
and practitioners alike have observed that agencies enjoy a very different autonomy in 
practice. Chiti (2013) indicates that there is a need to clarify the reasons why EU agencies 
engage in different forms of rule making in practice (p. 100). This raises these two questions:  
 
1. In how far have European agencies evolved beyond their formal decision-making 
powers?  
2. If so, what factors explain this difference between de jure and de facto autonomy? 
 
This research thus not only fills a gap in the literature on explanations for EU agencies’ 
practices but it is also relevant considering the current debate on accountability in the 
European Union. As long as accountability mechanisms are based on the formal powers of the 
agencies, they might not be effective enough in capturing and monitoring agency behaviour. 
From a practical point of view, it is important to notice that ‘agencification’ has not stopped. 
Instead, the economic and financial crisis has led to the set-up of new decentralised 
authorities that are among the most powerful ever created in the EU. This question - of how 
these agencies employ their powers in day-to-day life - can thus only gain in importance. The 
paper will thus employ a comparative case study design to study the evolution of agencies 
since their establishment, with a focus on their actual behaviour. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the theoretical framework and two main 
hypotheses, based on the multi-principles model by Dehousse (1997) and the institutionalist 
model of reputation building by Carpenter (2001). Then, the different concepts of (formal and 
informal) autonomy, as well as reputation are operationalised and the different methods 
(semi-structured interviews, content analysis) employed are explained. The formal autonomy 
of the four agencies is summarised in one chapter, while the informal autonomy of agencies 
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and the evolution of their reputation over the last decade is analysed for each case separately. 
These results are then discussed, and related to the Common Approach to Decentralised 
Agencies introduced by the European Commission. Concluding, the research shows that all 
agencies have developed a level of informal autonomy independent from their initial design to 
a certain extent. Furthermore, the success of an agency in achieving this de-facto autonomy 
can be explained by linking the agencies’ strategies for reputation building and the relations 
between the agencies’ principals, Commission, European Parliament and member states. 
Nevertheless, all agencies are also connected in one overarching system and are thus all 
affected by external factors such as the scarcity of resources brought about the economic 
crisis. The independent variables however can explain the degree to which an agency’s 
informal autonomy is affected by it. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
For this research, I first need to clarify what is exactly an agency in the EU. This question has 
been a contentious point since the moment agencies have been established. The European 
Commission (2005) defines an agency as "any autonomous legal entity set up by the 
legislative authority, in order to help regulate a particular sector at European level and help 
implement a Community policy“. This definition would include forty bodies, among them 
executive agencies set up for a temporary time period, as well as the Euratom agencies. 
However, this paper will only focus on the permanent ‘EU level public authorities with a legal 
personality and a certain degree of organizational and financial autonomy that are created by 
acts of secondary legislation in order to perform clearly specified tasks’ (Kelemen, 2005, p. 
175). Thus, this research focuses on the thirty-one decentralised bodies that have been 
established since the early 90s.  
Conceptualisations of the agencies organisational structure, as well as typologies of 
their tasks are numerous. Their institutional design is relatively homogeneous, especially in 
comparison with agencies at the national level. Barbieri & Ongaro (2008) identify an EU type 
of agency “with a very limited degree of conctractualization, limited financial autonomy as 
well as very limited managerial autonomy concerning personnel and the organizational 
design, though it does have autonomy in the definition of policy instruments (p. 414). Most 
often, EU agencies are categorised according to their tasks. These can be divided into two 
broad categories. On the one hand, the more powerful agencies play a direct role in the 
regulation of certain policy fields. Thus, if a pharmaceutical company would like to launch a 
new product in the internal market, or an international air travel company wants to offer 
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flights in the European Union, they need to undergo the European Medicines Agency’s or the 
European Aviation Safety’s authorization procedures (Gehring & Krahpol 2007). 
Nevertheless, the large majority of agencies find themselves very far from these examples. 
Their tasks lie mainly in the socialisation of the national agencies’ personnel, the facilitation 
of exchanges of data and professional standards, and the coordination of extensive expert 
networks. All of this is then supposed to lead to a de-facto harmonisation of national 
practices, a sort of European integration through coordination. Consequently, Barbieri & 
Ongaro (2008) also differentiate between an authorization agency (e.g. the European 
Medicines Agency) and a coordination/information agency (e.g. the European Environment 
Agency). 
An important aspect of these role conceptions is the concept of autonomy. Often used 
interchangeably with ‘independence’ in the literature on EU agencies, autonomy denotes in 
how far the relationship between the agencies and its political masters allows for independent 
decision-making (Busuioc & Groenleer, 2013, p. 287). Barbieri & Ongaro (2008) differentiate 
between three aspects of autonomy: financial managerial and strategic (does the agency have 
its own budget, manage its staff on its own and set its strategic goals?) (p. 402). Wonka & 
Rittberger (2010) measure formal institutional independence on four components: the formal 
mandate, the rules for appointing the agency director, the rules for the selection of the 
agency’s staff, the rules for the appointment of the agency’s management board, and the 
formal relationships with its principals (Commission, Parliament, member states) (p. 738f). 
These categorisations are based on the formal rules structuring agency behaviour, such as the 
degree of de jure autonomy laid down in the basic regulations establishing the agencies. 
However, agencies can also develop a de facto autonomy, defined as “the capacity that an 
organization develops to manage its own affairs, separate from its political overseers“ 
(Busuioc & Groenleer, 2013, p. 287). 
Thus, Egeberg & Trondal (2011) have detected in a large-scale survey of agency 
personnel that “there is somewhat more involvement in regulatory, or ‘quasi-regulatory’, 
tasks than formally prescribed” (p. 871). This task expansion includes decisions on individual 
cases, the preparation of individual cases for the European Commission, the issuance of 
guidelines on implementation of EU law in the member states and involvement in national 
agencies (ibid, p. 875). Unfortunately, the response rates for the individual agencies were so 
low that the authors were not able to draw any conclusions about variations between agencies. 
Wonka & Rittberger (2010) also encourage further research into the differences between de-
facto and de jure decision-making powers, as their “index captures merely the formal-
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institutional independence of EU agencies but not post-delegation behaviour of agency staff 
in individual Decisions” (p. 738).  
The dominant approach that has been used to explain levels of autonomy not only on 
the EU but also the national level is principal-agent-theory. In general, this framework 
explains autonomy in terms of a relationship between an agent (e.g. an independent agency) 
and a principal (e.g. a ministry). The principal has established an independent body for the 
execution of a task that she does not have the capacity for. The agent needs a certain level of 
autonomy in order to implement this task effectively. However, the principal always has to 
fear the possibility of information loss or agency drift, when the agent’s preferences do not 
coincide with the principal’s. Thus, the principal employs different control mechanisms to 
counteract these developments (Miller & Whitford 2006). The approach has been developed 
in an American context but is also used to explain the emergence and development of non-
majoritarian institutions in European countries (Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2011).  
Dehousse (2008) has adapted the approach to European Union agencies, resulting in a 
multi-principals framework. He argues that the weak formal powers of the agencies are a 
result of the number of principals. Indeed, Egeberg & Trondal (2011) have discovered that 
EU agencies work in a very complex institutional environment, interacting with the European 
Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, national ministry departments, national 
independent agencies, international organisations, as well as interest groups (p. 869). They do 
not fear agency drift but “‘political drift’, in which agencies are somehow ‘captured’ by one 
of their institutional rivals in the leadership contest (Dehousse, 2008, p. 796). This means that 
the institutional design of the agencies includes a set of control mechanisms that is so 
complex that it loses its deterring power: “the logic of collective control by multiple 
principals has been taken to such an extent that it may actually weaken the possibility of 
sanctioning their agent’s misconduct“ (p. 801).  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more principals an agency has, the larger is the difference between its de 
jure and de facto autonomy. 
 
Over the last years, the topic has often been researched in single or comparative case studies. 
Thus, Martens (2010) has researched the relationship between the Commission DG 
Environment and the European Environment Agency. In addition, Schout & Peyreira (2011) 
have studied the institutionalisation of Human Resource policies in EU agencies, and Busuioc 
& Groenleer (2013) have conducted a comparative case study of Europol and Eurojust, 
focussing on the two agencies’ de-facto autonomy. These case studies have employed 
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institutionalism (March & Olson 1984) as their main theoretical framework. Here, institutions 
evolve beyond their formal institutional design and acquire autonomy through a process of 
institutionalisation. According to Jepperson (1991), this is a process where ‘action’ (when 
social patterns are consciously reproduced through mobilisation) becomes institutions (where 
only enactment of social patterns takes place) (p. 148). The outcome is an organisation that 
has turned from a formal organisation into a social institution (Selznick 1957). These 
institutions have become imbued with values, a process based primarily on fulfilling its 
members needs and promoted through administrative leadership. Carpenter (2001) studies a 
similar process in the case of US agencies. He describes how agencies build an identity and 
legitimacy through a process of reputation building. Busuioc & Groenleer (2013) thus 
propose a two-fold approach to institutionalisation. On the one hand, the internal dimension 
of the process “relates to the degree of consensus on the interpretation of the organization’s 
tasks” (p. 287). On the other hand, agencies derive autonomy from an external dimension: in 
how far does the organisation enjoy support from other actors in the environment? For this 
purpose, the agency has to prove its merit and competences to the EU institutions, as well as 
member states and interest groups. An important aspect of reputation building is thus also the 
perception of the agency’s effectiveness (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013, Majone 1997).  
 
Hypothesis 2: The more positive an agency’s reputation is, the larger is the difference 
between its de jure and de facto autonomy.  
 
Both approaches to agency autonomy share the basic assumption that the agency (the agent) 
wants to achieve more autonomy. However, they differ in the perspectives they take. The 
multi-principals model analyses the development of autonomy from the perspective of the 
principals. Autonomy (both formal and informal) is here the result of relations between 
principals. It is assumed that the agent takes advantage of these struggles but the manner in 
which he is doing this does not form part of the analysis. On the other hand, the 
institutionalisation framework focuses on the agencies, as well as the strategies they employ 
to lobby for more autonomy. The central authority (that we could also call the principals) is 
only part of a wider institutional framework, in which the agency manoeuvres. Efforts to 
incorporate the agent’s perspective in the principal-agent framework have been made before, 
also in the analysis of national agencies (Hedge, Scicchitano & Metz 1991, Richards & Smith 
2006, Barbieri et al. 2013). However, in the research on decentralised agencies in the 
European Union, both approaches have rather peacefully co-existed. Even if they might have 
been used as the basis of analysis, this fact has certainly not been made explicit or tested in 
any meaningful way. This research thus not only contributes to the existing empirical 
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literature on the informal autonomy of EU agencies but also tries to expand the theoretical 
view of EU agencies’ autonomy. How could this complementarity between the principal-
agent and the institutionalisation framework thus be achieved in practice? Some authors 
suggest the possibilities of sequences, where hypotheses need to build upon each other in 
order to explain an outcome (Jupille et al. 2003, p. 22). First developed as an attempt to 
bridge rational and constructivist approaches in European Union Studies (Fearon & Wendt, 
2002, p. 64), sequencing could also help to clarify the linkages between the principal-agent 
and institutionalist frameworks. Indeed, it might be even more suitable because the 
differences that need to be bridged are not as large in the latter case. In order to account for 
sequences, Zahariadis (2013) proposes a research design that also includes evolutions and 
time as factors in the analysis. Thus, the cases in this paper include the evolution of EU 
agencies since their establishment, tracing the changes in the variables over the different 
stages of development. Hopefully, this research can thus also lead to an indication at what 
stages or in what circumstances each perspective is dominant. 
 
 
3. Operationalisation  
 
These theoretical approaches contain a number of concepts that require further definition and 
operationalisation. Most important is the conceptualisation of “autonomy”. Carpenter (2001) 
defines bureaucratic autonomy “when bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own 
wishes, actions to which politicians and organized interests defer even though they would 
prefer that other actions (or no action at all) be taken” (p. 4). Different authors focus on 
various aspects of the concept. Thus, Wonka & Rittberger (2010) employ a categorisation by 
Gilardi (2008) for the independence of regulatory agencies in general, measured on four 
aspects: first, the agency’s formal mandate, second, the rules for appointing the agency head, 
third, the rules for appointing the members of an agency’s management board, and fourth, the 
agency’s formal relationship with governments, the Commission and the EP and its 
consultation obligations when preparing proposals which can build procedural constraints on 
an agency’s discretion (p. 738). On the other hand, Busuioc & Groenleer (2013) use a far 
broader conceptualisation of autonomy as the agency’s mission and role (1), its management 
and governance structures (2), its relations with policy networks and relationships with other 
actors (3), and the agency’s outputs and effects on politics (4). For this research, the formal, 
de jure, autonomy of an agency is analysed based on the aspects put forward by Barbieri & 
Ongaro (2008). They focus on three areas: first, the financial autonomy of an agency, second, 
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its managerial autonomy (including the management of its financial, human, and 
organizational resources, and the autonomy of the director in determining the staff size, the 
agency organizational structure, and the appointment of agency managers), and third, its 
strategic autonomy, meaning the “influence of the agency on the formulation of the policy 
targets and on the selection of instruments to implement the policy” (p. 402).  
Figure 1: Indicators for the Autonomy of EU Decentralised Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carpenter (2001) describes how regulatory agencies in the United States expanded their 
autonomy through reputation building: “by leaning on his friends in professional and 
scientific circles and by massively publicizing his bureau’s accomplishments, he had 
Figure : Autonomy of European Union Decentralised Agency
Formal Autonomy
1. Financial
= capacity to acquire extra financial resources besides the community
subsidy
- the agency can sell its products/services
- the agency can borrow on capital markets
2. Managerial
= management of its financial, human, and organisational resources
- autonomy of executive director in determining staff size, agency
organisational structure, appointment of agency managers
- chance for agency staff not to be subjected to Community regulation?
- opportunity for agency to deliberate on financial transactions +
expenditure levels?
3. Strategic
- influence of the agency on the formulation of policy targets
-influence of the agency on the selection of instruments to implement
the policy
Informal Autonomy
1. Financial
- does the agency make use of the possibility to have other revenues
than the community budget? How is it organised?
2. Managerial
- How transparent is the budgeting procedure? (Acivity Based
Management)
- effectiveness of the management/administrative board in controlling
the agency and holding the executive director accountable
3. Strategic
- line between political and technical aspects of policy (does the
agency overstep this boundary?)
- process of drawing up the annual and multi-annual work programmes
(input of different actors, deadlines etc.)
Based on: Barbieri & Ongaro (2008)
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convinced much of the nation’s press that his organization possessed unique and unparalleled 
expertise“ (p. 1). According to him, an agency needs “a reputation for expertise, efficiency, or 
moral protection and a uniquely diverse complex of ties to organized interests and the media“ 
(p. 4). He distinguishes between two features: reputational uniqueness and political 
multiplicity. Agencies have to prove both that they have unique capabilities to provide 
solutions for policy problems and form diverse coalitions that are not grounded in just one 
interest group, party or political affiliation (p. 5). This research thus focuses on two aspects of 
an EU agency’s reputation: its perceived effectiveness (Is the information and scientific 
advice provided by the agency perceived as valuable neutral? Does the agency fill a niche and 
offer unique policy/technical solutions?), and its political support (by interest and industry 
groups, the scientific community, member states’ administrations, international organisations, 
the European Commission, the European Parliament). For the former, I take the agencies’ 
ambitions into account as well, as evidenced by the Basic Regulations of ECHA and EFSA. 
In addition, I focus especially on the agencies’ reputations as perceived by the media and the 
European Parliament (also as a an indication for the opinion of the wider public). As this 
paper thus analyses the difference between an agency’s formal and informal autonomy, its 
reputation and its principles, it requires four cases to study in order to cover the variation in 
the dependent variable. This case selection is explained in further detail in the next section. 
 
4. Case Selection  
 
How have the four cases that are studied in this paper been selected? The population of 
agencies that is of interest to this study are the over thirty decentralised, permanent ones, as 
defined by the European Commission. Thus, temporary agencies, as well as the executive 
Commission agencies are not considered. In addition, the most recent agencies (e.g. the 
Institute for Gender Equality) are not included because not enough time has passed yet to 
observe an evolution. The four cases are selected on the independent variables. However, 
cases are held constant on one variable (formal autonomy in the original, institutional design) 
in order to exclude the influence of path dependency. The formal autonomy scores are 
determined on the basis of the most recent study by Wonka & Rittberger (2010). Thus, twelve 
agencies are pre-selected. Regarding the first hypothesis, a proxy for reputation is found 
through content analysis of newspaper articles (coded on negative/positive/scandal) from the 
European Voice. This data source is selected because national newspapers often do not report 
on these EU issues and the European Voice is a very important information source for 
professionals working in Brussels. In the end, the reputation of the four selected agencies in 
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the media is based on the analysis of all 430 articles published between 2002 and 2014 that 
mention one the agencies by name. The articles are coded either as positive (e.g. an 
achievement of the agency is lauded), neutral (the agency is mentioned but no value 
judgement is included), negative (the article mentions criticisms of individual tasks or reports 
executed by the agency) or scandal (e.g. demands for the Executive Director’s resignation; the 
agency’s whole existence is called into question). For the second hypothesis, the number of 
principals is approximated based on the composition of the agencies’ management boards. 
The same indicator for the number of principals is also used by Wonka & Rittberger (2010) in 
their quantitative study of agency autonomy. These are displayed in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Agencies Considered in the First Step of the Case Selection 	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Table 2: Criteria for Case Selection 
 
These four cases were chosen from the list above, also taking into account the budget and 
staff sizes of the agencies. The graph below shows the development of these agency’s 
budgets. The budgets have been overall increasing over the least ten years. 
Figure 2: Budget Development of the Four Agencies 20003-2012 
 
(Source: Annual Reports by the European Court of Auditors) 
 
These agencies are decentralised agencies; the results of this research can thus not be applied 
to the temporary, executive agencies the European Commission sets up for specific tasks. 
However, they should be generalisable to other EU agencies from the former first pillar that 
form the majority of the agency population in the European Union. For very high profile 
agencies, like the border agency Frontex, or agencies that have are established after the 
Lisbon Treaty (like the new banking authorities), the mechanisms of autonomy and reputation 
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might work differently. Nevertheless, there remain a significant number of agencies that 
resemble EFSA, EMSA, ECHA or ECDC enough to draw more generalised conclusions. The 
methods used and the validity of the data sources should contribute to these efforts at 
generalisation and are explained hereafter. 
 
5. Methodology and Data Collection 
 
The data sources for this project mainly include policy documents from the agencies and EU 
institutions. Information on the their formal and informal autonomy is drawn from the 
agencies’ Founding Regulations, financial regulations, staff regulations, annual work 
programmes, budget reports and the minutes of their management boards’ meetings, as well 
as the annual reports by the European Court of Auditors. The Basic Regulations also stipulate 
that every five years an independent evaluation of an external consultancy is carried out, 
which were consulted as well. Furthermore, eleven semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between mid-May and the beginning of July 2014 with members of the 
management boards of the agencies, agency personnel, Members of the European Parliament, 
as well as Commission officials1. Depending on the location of the interviewee, these 
interviews were conducted either on location or over the phone. The languages used were 
English, French, Dutch and German and took between one and two hours. However, in order 
to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents, they were all translated to English afterwards. 
Interviewing as a research method always includes certain limitations regarding the reliability 
and validity of the data obtained. For this research, I have tried to contact respondents with 
different perspectives and interests for each agency. However, this does not eliminate the 
possibility of bias caused by the fact that I only interviewed people, who answered my 
requests. Indeed, I have received more rejections for interview requests from interest group 
representatives and the agency officials themselves. Nonetheless, this research could not be 
conducted without interviews, as information on informal coordination and decision-making 
cannot be found in public documents. The independent variable of reputation is mainly drawn 
from three data sources. First, the interviews also included assessments of the agencies’ 
reputations as well as their development over time. Second, the data sources include the 
media analysis that is also used to determine the case selection. Third, parliamentary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At this point, I would also like to sincerely thank the interview respondents, who have 
supported my research in such a generous way. I would also like to stress that these are the 
respondents’ personal views and that they do not officially speak for their organisations or 
institutions. 
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questions2 on the agencies in the European Parliament are analysed. All of the 523 questions 
asked to the European Commission between 2002 and 2014 were included in a database and 
coded on a dichotomous variable (1 = includes criticism of the agency, 0 = does not include 
criticism). In addition, the database includes information on the year, the parliamentary term 
and the party identity of the questioner(s). The appendix includes an extensive overview of all 
variables and indicators, as well as the interview questions.  
 
6.1 Formal Autonomy of EU Agencies 
 
As a consequence of the case selection, all four agencies display similar levels of formal 
autonomy. Thus, I will summarise their autonomy and institutional design in this chapter. 
They are all at least partly financed through the EU budget, and is thus subject to both 
discharge by the European Parliament’ budget committee and control by the Court of 
Auditors. In addition, non-EU member states make a contribution to EFSA’s budget and its 
Basic Regulation (2002) allows the agency to generate additional revenue through “charges 
for publications, conferences, training and any other similar activities“ (art. 43.1). However, 
until now, these opportunities are unused. ECHA is an exception, as "the Agency should be 
financed partly by fees paid by natural or legal persons and partly by the general budget of the 
European Communities" (2006 Basic Regulation, art. 96.1). ECHA demands fees from 
companies for the registration of their chemical substances, which then form part of the 
agency’s budget. 
The management board (or administrative board, in EMSA’s case) and the European 
Commission set the agencies’ financial rules, in accordance with general EU law (Basic 
Regulation, 2003, art. 25.9 Amendment). Thus, EMSA’s Basic Regulation from 2002 has, for 
example, been amended four times, the last time in 2013 together with the agency’s financial 
regulation, also as a response to EU wide budget cuts and the threat of Commission staff 
reduction (Interview European Commission Official 3). Every agency is represented and 
managed by the Executive Director, who has a multitude of responsibilities. These also 
include the nomination of staff, the drafting and implementation of the work programmes, the 
execution of the budget, as well as coordination with the Commission and the European 
Parliament (ibid, art. 26.2). The staffs of all agencies are subject to the EU’s staff regulation 
(ibid, art. 48.1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The parliamentary questions were retrieved from the website of the European Parliament 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html), using the agency 
names as search terms. 
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The agencies’ agendas and strategic objectives are set by the Commission, the member 
states and the EP. These strategic goals then form the main part of the work programmes 
(both annual and multi-annual). E.g. EMSA has a clearly delimited mandate that only 
includes giving "technical and scientific assistance needed and with a high level of expertise, 
in order to help them to apply Community legislation properly in the field of maritime safety 
and prevention of pollution by ships, to monitor its implementation and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the measures in place" (art. 1.2). However, they are completely independent 
in their implementation. The ECDC is an example in this, as "in the case of outbreaks of 
illness of unknown origin which may spread within or to the Community, the Centre should 
be empowered to act on its own initiative until the source of the outbreak is known and then 
in cooperation with the relevant competent authorities at national or Community level as 
appropriate" (ECDC Basic Regulation 2004). All in all, the agencies thus display low levels 
of financial and relatively low levels of managerial autonomy. Although their strategic goals 
are formally mostly set for them, they all are very free in the choice of policy and technical 
instruments at their disposal. All of this relates to the agencies’ formal levels of autonomy but 
how are these legal provisions executed in the practice of day-to-day decision-making?  
 
7. The Evolution of EU Agencies – Informal Autonomy, Reputation, and 
Principal-Agent Relations 
 
The following chapters deal with each of the four agencies separately. First, a short summary 
of the agency’s history and current organisational structure is given. Second, the informal 
autonomy of the agency as the dependent variable is analysed, based on the conducted 
interviews and documents and drawing on the indicators elaborated above. Third, the 
evolution of the agency’s reputation and the relations between its principals are discussed.  
 
7.1 European Food Safety Authority 
 
The agency was established in 2002 in Parma, Italy. EFSA produces risk assessments in the 
form of “scientific opinions and advice to provide a sound foundation for European policies 
and legislation and to support the European Commission, European Parliament and EU 
Member States in taking effective and timely risk management decisions“ (EFSA 2014). 
Topic areas in the agency’s remit include the safety of food and animal seed, nutrition, animal 
and plant health, as well as Genetically Modified Organisms. Next to the EU member states, 
Iceland and Norway are part of EFSA. The agency responds both to requests from the EU 
institutions and the member states, and acts on its own initiative (Basic Regulation, Art. 22). 
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The management board that 
is made up of seventeen 
independent experts drawn 
from the member states 
governs EFSA. Thus, the 
only body in the agency 
where all countries are 
represented is the advisory 
forum that meets four to six 
times a year. It is chaired by 
the agency’s director and 
serves as a forum for 
collaboration and discussion between the member states. The body advises EFSA on 
scientific matters related to risk assessment and communication, however it has no say in the 
day-to-day management of the agency itself or any administrative matters (EFSA website). 
The agency is connected to the Commission Directorate-General for Health and Consumers 
SANCO (formally called the ‘parent DG’ of the agency). The Commission also has one 
representative on the management board and the advisory forum respectively, and may attend 
meetings of the Scientific Committee, the scientific panels or the working groups. In addition, 
the agency coordinates with the European Parliament committees concerned with the 
environment, agriculture or consumer protection. 
 
7.1.1. Informal Autonomy 
 
 
The European Commission has the most influence on EFSA’s work and strategy. Although 
the work programme is nominally drafted by the agency and then amended according to the 
Commission’s and member states demands, the initial draft is already completely approved of 
by the Commission (Interview Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). In comparison, the 
member states’ contributions are minuscule, which is not only a result of the European 
Commission’s dominance but also a lack of coordination between member states. Although 
an Information Exchange Platform exists, the exchange of national research agendas is not 
going well, mainly because member states are not interested enough in EFSA to put an effort 
into collaboration. “Trust is the magic word”, as one Member of EFSA’s Advisory Forum 
put, regarding the sharing of national agendas. Furthermore, there is only a short timeframe to 
give comments on the work programme and no real discussion takes place in the advisory 
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forum. In fact, one of the national representatives called the whole situation “a bit 
schizophrenic”, where “member states want the research agendas taken into account but are 
afraid that the agency takes over too many national competences (Interview Member 
Advisory Forum EFSA 1).  
Conflict between the Commission and the agency is only rarely publicised. One such 
instance is the implementation of the Health Claims Directive. Here, EFSA went against DG 
SANCO and published its scientific opinions in batches (parliamentary question by Nessa 
Childers, May 6, 2010). Thus, purely administrative or scientific decisions also display 
political aspects. This blurring of the line between the technical and the political is an often-
mentioned complaint of all agencies’ work and also included in the agency’s external 
evaluation from 2012. In the case of EFSA, this line especially refers to the distribution of 
competences between risk assessment and risk management. The agency’s mandate only 
included risk assessment of substances and methods, while risk management is the task of the 
European Commission or the national authorities. However, member state representatives 
doubt that such a clear-cut separation is even possible in food safety (Interview Member 
Advisory Forum EFSA 1), neither on the European nor the national level. As long as the 
agency thus fulfils its tasks, it can overstep its mandate without getting into conflict with 
either the Commission or the member states. 
On the other hand, the mandate of EFSA is also kept very vague in regard to its 
competences, as “the Authority shall provide scientific advice and scientific and technical 
support for the Community's legislation and policies in all fields which have a direct or 
indirect impact (emphasis by author) on food and feed safety. It shall provide independent 
information on all matters within these fields and communicate on risks” (EFSA Basic 
Regulation, 2002, art. 22.2). There are very few subjects that do not have an indirect impact 
on food safety. This is also the basis for the extension of EFSA’s competences to include the 
assessment of health claims. This extension of competences is also a result of the agency’s 
directors campaigning for new tasks, like Geslain-Lanéelle in an interview for the European 
Voice on November 23, 2006: “’We want to become the reference body for a healthy diet’”. 
The Executive Director also has to appear in front of the Environment, Public Health, 
and Food Safety committee of the European Parliament for questioning.  This formal session 
is described as a “very complex situation, [where] the problem is not that the agency does not 
provide information but that there is too much information” (Interview MEP1). Thus, it is 
rather difficult for the EP to hold an agency accountable, depending on the director to present 
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to them the whole picture. The MEPs then need to make the judgement if the Executive 
Director is “convincing” (ibid) or not. 
 
7.1.2. Reputation Building 	  
The European Food Safety Agency was established for several reasons after several food 
safety crises and scares in the late 1990s, including BSE. The first idea was the creation of 
more transparency in the assessment of risks of food stuff, a process that had until then been 
up more or less to the industries themselves. A second aspect was the separation between the 
research and the political decision-making that should make the process more accountable 
(Interview Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). The necessity of some kind of body in this 
policy field has never been doubted because “independent judgement is incredibly important 
for the policy area, and its coordinating role is useful” (Interview MEP 1). This also means 
that the reputation of the agency has been crucial for its work from the beginning, as 
evidenced by an addition to the Basic Regulation in 2004: "The confidence of the Community 
institutions, the general public and interested parties in the Centre is essential. For this reason, 
it is vital to ensure its independence, high scientific quality, transparency and efficiency". 
However, these promises could not completely be fulfilled. As one Member of Parliament 
notes, EFSA “never succeeded to gain a place in the hearts and minds of the people in 
general” and displays a “very mixed record of decisions: some good, then some bad again…a 
lot of conflict about the scientific advice” (Interview MEP 1).  
Already before the agency is set up, conflicts arise between member states about its 
location, resulting in the European Parliament withholding part of its funding (European 
Voice, 11-04-2002). After its establishment, criticism is limited mainly to the agency’s 
position on Genetically Modified Organisms and comes from environmental groups like 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. In these complaints, conflicts of interests play a large 
role. EFSA is continually accused of being too close to the food industry (European Voice, 
16-12-2004), as “on authorisation of GM crop: “Marta Vetier, Greenpeace's GM campaigner, 
said EFSA is the ‘laughing stock of the scientific community’. ‘Rubber-stamping anything the 
agrobiotech industry puts forward... is destroying its credibility’, she said” (European Voice, 
31-08-2008). These debates about EFSA’s scientific independence and reliability is a 
recurring theme in the media coverage of the agency, with phrases like “yet the assessment 
given by EFSA [...] has proven very controversial” (European Voice, 18-10-2007) or the 
controversy around the agency’s decision on Bisphenol A in 2010. 
While these criticisms of EFSA thus remained in the beginning limited to individual 
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scientific opinions and controversial topics, there are also more profound criticisms of 
EFSA’s role in policy-making. These complaints focus mostly on the agency’s information 
monopoly and demand that the Commission should also consult other sources (European 
Voice, 18-10-2007). This is interesting, considering that EFSA’s raison d’être consists of 
giving advice to the European Commission. Furthermore, the agency also struggled with the 
fundamental problem of scientific work. Sometimes there are no answers, however EFSA still 
has to provide an opinion: “The nuances of the scientific opinion will give ammunition to 
both sides in the tussle over whether the ban should be lifted. Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle, the 
executive director of EFSA, said that the European Commission faced ‘a difficult decision, 
because the scientific evidence does not exist’” (European Voice, 03-04-2008). 
From 2008 onwards, the criticism becomes stronger. Several things come together that 
damage the agency’s reputation. The first is a conflict around EFSA’s Executive Director 
Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle. She is accused of very poor management in 2008, probably 
resulting from her preference for a more hierarchical, French, system” (Interview Member 
Advisory Forum EFSA 1). Several former employees write an open letter to Members of the 
European Parliament, complaining about “A culture of fear and despair at food agency” (title 
of an article in the European Voice from September 4, 2008). The Executive Director then has 
to report to the EP, where she does not convince but is allowed to remain in office until her 
resignation in 2013. In this context, the controversy about EFSA’s location in Parma begins 
again because it appears to contribute to the staff’s dissatisfaction (European Voice, 13-11-
2008). 
Second, a special report by the European Court of Auditors on the management of 
conflicts of interests by EU agencies especially criticises the European Food Safety Authority. 
It seems that several members of the staff have been hired despite severe conflicts of interests, 
resulting from prior industry employment. However, their declaration of interests form have 
never been read or even properly filed. In addition, high profile personnel changes very 
quickly after their employment at EFSA to an industry position in the same field that they 
have worked on for the agency (European Court of Auditors 2012). This is exacerbated by the 
fact that the European Ombudsman detects similar irregularities in the procedures for staff 
selection and especially the composition of selection boards. Apparently conflicts of interest 
are not dealt with correctly (Case 775/2010, OI/4/2013/CK). Two cases highlight the 
problem: first, the European Parliament prevents the appointment of Mella Frewen, who has 
worked for Monsanto before, to EFSA’s management board, “since, with her being on the 
management board, every single decision of EFSA would have been criticised as too industry-
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friendly,’ said the MEPs, who were signatories to the letter sent to member states. ‘This 
simply cannot be in our interest. EFSA needs to focus on its important scientific tasks and not 
on human-resources decisions.’” (European Voice, 08-06-2012). Second, the revolving door 
phenomenon is a problem: Diána Bánáti, a former chairwoman of the EFSA, announces that 
she becomes the director of the International Life Sciences Institute Europe, a think tank 
funded by the food industry. Fittingly, an article on the topic is titled “Leaving a bad taste in 
the mouth” (European Voice, 14-06-2012). However, a member of the agency’s advisory 
forum also admits that conflicts of interests in such a policy field are very difficult to manage, 
with almost all scientists involved with industry projects at some point, and national 
institutions struggling with similar issues. There might thus also be differences in perception 
between politicians, the wider public, and the scientific community here (Interview Member 
Advisory Forum EFSA 1). 
The third is the afore-mentioned Health Claims Directive, implemented in 2012, that 
extends EFSA’s competences: “in the early times, the agency only dealt with food safety, that 
is much more simple…health claims are much more difficult to assess and more 
controversial...that did not do a lot of good to the reputation of the agency…” (Interview MEP 
1). Not only are health claims more difficult to assess than safety issues from a purely 
scientific point of view but there are also problems with the Directive’s implementation, as 
the agency does not have enough resources: “yes, it is more complex but the panel also had 
too high a workload…” (Interview Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). At the same time, the 
European Parliament also refuses to discharge the agency’s budget, adding to the public 
image of an organisation that is not capable of fulfilling its tasks anymore. In general, the 
blurred line between risk assessment and management might also cause this public 
perception. In the end, it is still the risk manager, the Commission, who has to take the 
decision. However, as one respondent argues, “transparency is still a problem in risk 
management” (Interview Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). EFSA thus also has to defend 
decisions to the public that it officially has not actually made. It is thus not surprising that the 
external evaluation published in 2012 detects a very fraught relationship between EFSA and 
the media. As a response to these events, EFSA’s conflict-of-interests policy is made stricter, 
and new transparency and communication strategies are implemented. The criticisms still 
leave a lasting impression, and accusations of bias flare up from time to time, especially 
concerning GM topics: “the EFSA report was rushed, because of ‘the pressure of special 
interest groups and the politics that have ensued as a consequence of that’” (European Voice, 
31-01-2013). Nevertheless, as Bernhard Url takes over as Executive Director in 2013, the 
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reputation of the agency improves. He seems to prefer a more conciliatory approach in 
relations with the public as well as the member states than his predecessor. One respondent 
claims, “trust in the agency has definitely grown, especially over the last year” (Interview 
Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). This dynamic, with attention for the agency’s work 
growing and reaching a peak in 2013 can also be seen in the analysis of questions by the 
European Parliament. 
 
Figure 4: Criticism of EFSA in EP Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, while the total amount of questions about EFSA increased, the percentage of 
them that includes criticisms remained relatively stable. An exception is the year 2012, where 
many parliamentary questions deal with the conflicts of interest in the agency, as well as 
demands to the European Commission to deal with them better. Otherwise, Genetically 
Modified Organisms are a recurring topic, with MEPs doubting the agency’s independence or 
citing studies by scientists in national institutions or universities. With a cross-tabulation, no 
significant relationship between the ideological position of a party on the left-right spectrum 
and the fact that a criticism is included could be found. However, it makes sense that the 
Greens as the party with the most interest in consumer protection, animal rights and food 
safety, not only asks a high number of questions but also includes the largest percentage of 
criticisms after the diverse group of independent MEPs.  
The European Food Safety Authority thus displays in general a low level of informal 
autonomy, with the European Commission dominating decision-making processes and the 
management board working relatively effectively at holding the agency accountable. 
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Furthermore, the agency has developed a very mixed reputation, influenced mostly conflicts 
of interest and instances of mismanagement, as well as a poor relationship with the media. 
This picture looks very different at another agency, EMSA.  
 
7.2 European Maritime Safety Agency 
 
The agency situated in Lisbon, 
Portugal, was established in 
2003 after the shipping 
accidents involving the vessels 
Erika (1999) and Prestige 
(2002). It employs more than 
200 people and has a budget of 
€58.8m (2013). The agency’s 
mandate is based on several 
EU Directives summarised 
under the three maritime safety 
packages. In a first step, ship controls in ports and inspections by member states were 
harmonised. Second, Directive 94/57/EC established a system of mutual recognition of 
Classification Societies and a vessel traffic monitoring and information system was 
established in 2002. From 2007 onwards, an integrated maritime policy has been developed in 
the EU that also focuses on pollution and other environmental concerns. In the end, the third 
maritime safety package was adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 2009 with the 
main objective of restoring the competitiveness of the sector while benefiting only those 
operators who respect the safety standards, in particular by increasing the pressure on owners 
of sub-standard ships (Interview EMSA Official). EMSA’s tasks include in assisting the 
Commission in implementation of EU regulation (ship construction, inspection of port 
controls, reduction of ship waste, certification of classification societies), operation of the 
SafeSeaNet vessel tracking system, pollution and oil spill monitoring, as well as providing the 
European Commission with information and scientific advice (Basic Regulation, 2002, Art. 
2). It focuses especially on two aspects of maritime safety: first, preventing and giving aid in 
the case of shipping accidents. Second, the agency uses monitoring in order to prevent 
perverse competition, where ship owners register their vessels in a country with very low 
standards (Interview MEP 2). Until now, the agency has had two Executive Directors, Willem 
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de Ruiter and Markku Mylly. The director reports to the Administrative Board made up of 
member state, Commission, EP and interest representatives.  
 
7.2.1. Informal Autonomy 
 
Overall, respondents emphasize the independence of the agency. Both the Commission 
official and the member of the administrative board use the term ‘micro-management’ as 
something that they try to avoid. Especially with the introduction of activity-based 
management, the Commission still has to “let them be independent – micromanagement 
wouldn’t help, as long as the results are there, it is not necessary…I do not have to know what 
staff is on what specific project with what budget” (Interview European Commission Official 
3). On other hand, the member states “do not want micro-management but still want to know 
what the agency is doing” (Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). Mobility and 
Transport, the responsible DG for EMSA, is every day in contact with the agency, discussing 
problems or reports, requesting information or inspection reports. Thus, there is almost 
nothing going on at EMSA that the European Commission is not aware off. They also set the 
agency’s strategic agenda and objectives, with 95% of the work programme’s draft proposal 
consisting of input from the Commission: “already before the draft version is provided to the 
board, there are consultations between Commission and agency…the work programme is 
certainly no surprise at all to the Commission…” (Interview European Commission Official 
3). On the other hand, member state representatives complain that there is very little space for 
change in the programme. Indeed, until changes in the drafting process in 2014, “the 
administrative procedures were so complicated that the administrative board could do no 
more than nod through the finished programme” (Interview Member Administrative Board 
EMSA). Now, the first draft of a programme is already drawn up more than a year before its 
publication, thus leaving more room for discussion in the board.  
Similar criticisms also appear about other tasks of the administrative board that meets 
three times a year: “three, four years ago, the administrative board was not informed well 
enough. People came to the meetings, who did not have the knowledge and had no idea what 
they were doing” (Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). However, this changed 
with the establishment of an administrative and finance committee, where only member 
states, who are really interested, become members. This development has led to far better 
insights into the activities of the agency (ibid). This is confirmed by the Commission official, 
who sees that representatives do not really familiarise themselves with the agency’s activities 
beyond the documents they are provided with, although the agency provides all the 
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information necessary. The official also confirms the importance of the administrative and 
finance committee that is more suitable to day-to-day monitoring. In general, the view from 
this perspective seems to be that “the board is quite attached to the agency, however it doesn’t 
want to let it grow beyond its current competences” (Interview European Commission 
Official 3 
One of the main criticisms levelled at EU agencies by the Member States concerns the 
border between technical and policy solutions, with the agencies sometimes accused of 
overstepping their mandates. In the 2012 external evaluation, “a number of Member States 
express concern that there is insufficient focus on EMSA as a technical body and the 
Commission as a policy body. It was felt that EMSA should go more into technical 
discussions”. The evaluation also mentions the possibility of duplication of the Committee on 
Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS). Here, very different views 
emerge from the EU institutions on the one hand, and the member states on the other. A MEP 
disregards the criticism as “just the usual member state complaints” (Interview MEP 2), while 
the Commission official is adamant that “the mandate is very strict, and the agency has to 
stick to the tasks described in the basic regulation” (Interview European Commission Official 
3). Thus, the Commission is involved when there is contact between the agency and third 
countries, as for the anti-pollution network, and inspection reports need to be as detailed as 
possible in order to allow for scrutiny. However, there is also a very vague concession that 
“the line between political and technical is sometimes difficult to determine” (ibid). Having 
said that, one member of the administrative board is very sure that “the agency’s senior 
management, and especially the Executive Director, sure has some free space to manoeuvre 
that he can use…Willem de Ruiter was especially good at using this space”. The same 
representative also admits, “the member states allow this, as long as the agency fulfils the 
member states’ demands” (Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). 
 
7.2.2. Reputation Building 
 
The overall reputation of the European Maritime Safety Agency is very positive. Respondents 
from the EU institutions argue, “the agency has an excellent reputation and is accepted by 
everybody” (Interview European Commission Official 3). This sentiment by a Commission 
official is confirmed by a MEP claiming that both Commission and EP are very much in 
support of EMSA (Interview MEP 2). The agency especially shines in comparison with the 
other agency in the transport field, EASA: “EMSA has always been the best functioning 
agency, as well as one of the most effective ones” (ibid). The respondent also sees a definite 
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improvement in the technical details of Commission proposals on maritime safety policy. The 
European Parliament also supports more competences and resources for EMSA. In the past, 
the extension of tasks has been a problem because the agency did not have enough personnel 
to fulfil them (ibid). This support is also reflected in the parliamentary questions. 
In the 2008 external evaluation, some member states claim that EMSA only duplicates 
activities that could also be done by national authorities or the Internal Maritime 
Organisation. However, since then, the agency seems to have carved a niche for itself in the 
policy field. Some member states cite economic benefits through CleanSeaNet and the 
certification of classification societies (Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). The 
MEP also argues that the member states do not mind having the agency as a scapegoat in case 
of an oil spill or other catastrophes. Furthermore, EMSA is trusted by both the shipping 
industry and the trade unions, despite the tensions between themselves (Interview MEP 2). 
The agency also seems to have no problems with conflicts of interests; the media coverage on 
both this and other topics is very neutral. 
Among the member states one fault line can be found between the North and South of 
Europe. The North Sea states, especially Germany and the Netherlands, have been completely 
against the establishment of EMSA. On the other hand, the countries along the Mediterranean 
Sea depend on the agency’s resources. However, the Northern European states seem to have 
accepted EMSA’s existence over time and see a certain added value when it comes to the 
harmonisation of pollution thresholds or the certification of classification societies. Conflict 
between the Commission and the member states focuses mostly on the transfer of inspection 
reports and other information to the member states. One representative claims, “the 
Commission uses this information as an instrument of power…the agency would like to 
transmit the data but the Commission does not allow it” (Interview Member Administrative 
Board EMSA). Furthermore, member states would like the number of inspection visits 
decreased, and focus more on lessons learned during the visits and the sharing of best 
practices between countries. In addition, a Commission official argues, member states fear the 
development of an integrated maritime system that would lead to more competences for the 
agency (Interview European Commission Official 3). On the other hand, the agency has very 
good connections to the EP, with EMSA “lobbying very effectively for itself in the 
Parliament” (ibid). This is mostly reflected in the data on parliamentary questions. In general, 
EMSA is rarely mentioned in the questions, with the largest number in 2012 at eight 
questions. 
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Figure 6: Criticism of EMSA in EP Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of questions is far too small to run any kind of meaningful statistical analysis on 
them. Nevertheless, they show that support of EMSA is overall high in the Parliament and has 
grown over time, with no criticisms at all in both 2002 and 2013. Another evidence of this 
support is also the fact that some MEPs used the shipping accident involving the Costa 
Concordia in January 2012 to suggest increasing the tasks and competences of EMSA. In fact, 
many of the earlier questions including criticism focussed on issues where the agency actually 
has no mandate, and either the European Commission or the member states would have to 
take action. The same goes for the distribution of questions between party groups. Criticisms 
and non-criticisms hold each other relatively in balance and the low number of questions 
asked by each makes the drawing of reasonable conclusions rather difficult. 
All interview partners agree that the person of the Executive Director has an enormous 
influence on an agency’s work and reputation. A Commission official emphasises his role in 
the nomination of staff, which can make a large difference  (Interview European Commission 
Official 3). The member of the administrative board sees a difference in style between the two 
directors. Willem de Ruiter, as former Commission official, has displayed a very top-down, 
stringent management style that had been necessary for the set-up of the agency. However, he 
is also lauded as a very competent and responsible director, who gets things done (Interview 
MEP 2). On the other hand, Markku Myllu is more relaxed and far more cooperative in his 
dealings with the member states (interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). 
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Overall, EMSA has achieved a relatively high level of informal autonomy. Both 
Commission and member states accept that the agency occasionally oversteps its formal 
mandate, as long as it work effectively. The agency’s directors seem to have been very good 
at networking and especially lobbying the European Parliament that is very involved in 
EMSA’s welfare. Indeed, the agency has developed a reputation for functioning both 
effectively and efficiently, ready to take over new competences as well. The same cannot be 
wholly said for the next agency under discussion. 
 
7.3 European Chemicals Agency 
 
The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) was established in 2007 in Helsinki, in order to 
assist the European Commission, the member states, and chemical companies in the 
implementation of the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals) Regulation. In addition, under the Classification, Labelling and Packaging 
Regulation, companies have to notify ECHA of their labelling. The agency also provides 
information on the safety of specific chemicals to the EU institutions and member states. The 
aim of the system is a more harmonised and efficient implementation of chemicals policy than 
what could be achieved through national authorities (Interview Member Management Board 
ECHA). It has over 500 employees. ECHA follows the usual European Union agency design 
with an Executive Director at 
the top, who reports to a 
management board of 
member state, Commission, 
and industry representatives. 
As the agency has only been 
relatively recently 
established, it has only had 
one Executive Director, 
former Commission official 
Geert Dancet. 
 
7.3.1. Informal Autonomy 
 
ECHA is the only agency studied here that generates at least partly its own income based on 
registration fees. Although this fact has been a definite part of the original design of the 
agency, the way it has been practically implemented could not have been foreseen. A 
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company’s registration with ECHA takes three steps, distributed over years. However, the 
fees are charged at the beginning of the process. This means, the agency does not only have to 
save the company fees but manage and invest them responsibly. As a member of ECHA’s 
management board argues, “nobody expected that ECHA would do this kind of financial 
management – but it is a good driver for quality and efficiency! Now they have to be 
accountable…” (Interview Member Management Board ECHA). The same respondent also 
supports the introduction of activity-based management for the same reasons of 
accountability: “it is very simple, we want to know: how many people are working on this, 
how much budget do they use, and how does this benefit ECHA?” (ibid). Until now, ABM 
has only been partly introduced at ECHA. However, in the past very complex staffing plans 
and budgets have rendered the tasks of the management board more difficult, with the agency 
hiding facts behind meaningless indicators. 
In general, some of the member state representatives on the management board feel 
that they are not offered enough insights into the actual work of the agency. There are two 
possible reasons for this problem: first of all, there is a split between those member states that 
want to have a say and those who prefer to be more passive and follow ECHA’s or the 
Commission’s lead. The four, five member states that are very active thus have quite a large 
opposition against them (ibid). Second, the agency actively resists any kind of control that 
they perceive as too much. One member of the management board argues that the current 
director likes to be personally in control of everything that happens at the agency, however 
bodies like the Board of Appeal are viewed as an “enemy in the house” (Interview Member 
Management Board ECHA). The management board, and especially the member states thus 
find themselves in a situation where they are formally part of the process but are not actually 
supposed to check what ECHA is doing. Thus, the management board meetings are 
impeccably organised, its members provided with all the necessary documents but still, “the 
management board does not use its authorities and powers to the extent it could” (ibid). There 
is also the imbalance with the European Commission that is in very close and often informal 
contact with the agency, while the member states have fewer channels open to them for direct 
influence. This criticism, coming also from interest representatives, is already included in the 
External Evaluation from 2012: “ECHA has developed a culture of risk-aversion and caution 
[…] when facing uncertainties and difficulties in interpretations the Agency would generally 
turn to the Commission instead of taking a decision itself” (PWC, 2012, p. 46). As a 
consequence, one respondent argues, “the Commission should just have an executive agency 
if they want it to be like this” (Interview Member Management Board ECHA). This 
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imbalance is also reflected in the writing of ECHA’s work programmes: “at the end of the 
day, its ECHA who’s writing the thing” (ibid).  
7.3.2. Reputation Building 
 
Next to the European Food Safety Authority, ECHA is the only agency under consideration 
that explicitly mentions the importance of its reputation in its Basic Regulation (2006):  
"The Agency should be central to ensuring that chemicals legislation and the decision-
making processes and scientific basis underlying it have credibility with all 
stakeholders and the public. The Agency should also play a pivotal role in 
coordinating communication around this Regulation and in its implementation. The 
confidence in the Agency of the Community institutions, the Member States, the 
general public and interested parties is therefore essential. For this reason, it is vital to 
ensure its independence, high scientific, technical and regulatory capacities, as well as 
transparency and efficiency". 
 
One respondent agrees that there is a high emphasis on these aspects at the agency: “this is 
what we hear: reputation, reputation, reputation…we must avoid reputational damage” 
(Interview Member Management Board ECHA). Nevertheless, the member states, the 
Commission and interest groups are overall satisfied with the output and content that ECHA 
delivers (External Evaluation, 2012). However, there is criticism about the priorities ECHA 
sets. An example is the revoking of registration numbers of dossiers by companies that cannot 
prove that they are SMEs (which leads to lower fees). While some of the member states 
would like to extend this mechanism to empty or deficient dossiers in order to be more 
efficient, ECHA does not want to revoke any numbers in order to appease industry (Interview 
Member Management Board ECHA). Thus, “ECHA is keeping the machinery working 
smoothly but its output is heavy pieces of information…but if you look closely, you see that 
they do a lot but do they do the right thing?” (ibid). 
This connection of ECHA to industry is a common criticism that is focussed especially 
on the person of the Director. As former chief of DG Enterprise, Geert Dancet seems to feel a 
“huge loyalty not only to the Commission but also to industry” (Interview Member 
Management Board ECHA). The sentiment is also echoed in the media. Reporting on his 
appointment has focussed primarily on his independence from industry (portrait of Geert 
Dancet in the European Voice “The formula for independence”, 15-05-2008). Subsequently, 
these criticisms have appeared again from time to time: “the agency is ‘shrouded in a culture 
of secrecy – under pressure from the chemicals industry which claims business confidentiality 
as a means to prevent important information being released’” (European Voice, 19-10-2012). 
Nevertheless, his twenty years of experience in the European Commission have also meant 
that the director knows how to navigate inter-institutional relations:  “he knows how to work 
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with the Parliament…maintain a very good relationship…” (Interview Member Management 
Board ECHA). Despite the allegations that he is not independent enough from the industry, he 
could convince MEPs in the parliamentary meeting before his appointment (European Voice, 
17-07-2008).  
ECHA was also one of the agencies mentioned in the 2012 Special Report by the 
Court of Auditors, where it “says that ECHA management did not review the declarations of 
interest made by new staff members; the declarations were contained in their personnel files 
in sealed envelopes” (European Voice, 11-10-2012). In addition, the Court’s annual report 
(2012) on the agency’s management criticised that some declarations had not been filled 
correctly. Coupled with the already existing suspicions that the agency is too close to industry 
interests, these criticisms do not help ECHA’s public reputation: “when it comes to public 
trust, ECHA fails to see the real problems of insufficient transparency and conflicts of 
interest. The auditors' report should be a wake-up call” (European Voice, 15-11-2012). This 
seems to have been the case because one member of ECHA’s management board complained 
that ECHA has now gone too far in the other direction on conflicts of interests: “this was a 
major driver for ECHA to exaggerate in its conflict of interest policies…basically they 
developed such rules that it is impossible to do their work” (Interview Member Management 
Board ECHA). It also makes it difficult for national authorities to send their experts to work 
on scientific panels because they are not deemed independent enough. The impact of this 
report on the agency’s reputation can also be seen in the analysis of parliamentary questions.  
 
Figure 8: Criticism of ECHA in EP Questions 
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2012 is the year when ECHA receives the most attention in absolute numbers, including 
slightly more critical questions than non-critical ones. The report is also reflected in the 
content of the questions that year, with many MEPs demanding changes to the conflict of 
interest policies of the agency. Other criticisms focus on Bisphenol A, the use of animal 
testing, as well as the difficulties and delays ECHA faced in 2008, at the beginning of the 
registration phase. However, after 2012 the attention for the agency waned again. The group 
of the Socialists and Democrats has focussed most of its criticisms on the cost of the agency, 
as well as bringing complaints by animal rights and environmentalist groups to the 
Commission’s attention. The highest number of questions was asked however by the 
European People’s Party (included in the graph as PPE, as well as PPE-DE in the coalition 
with the Christian Democrats until 2009). Their questions cover a wide range of topics, with 
no apparent focus. In general, the agency has been very keen on developing its tasks and its 
resources, with very ambitious goals: “have a look at their vision mission statements, they 
want to be the scientific hub of Europe in this field, this is ridiculous” (Interview Member 
Management Board ECHA). Over the last couple of years, this ambition has clashed with the 
realities created by the economic crisis that have led to budget cuts, as well as plans to 
decrease staff in the agencies. 
In general, the European Chemicals Agency is very close to the European 
Commission, even in comparison with other agencies, which means relatively little 
development of informal autonomy, although the agency’s management board could work 
better at controlling ECHA. The agency’s mixed reputation is the result of the perception that 
the ECHA is formally well run but too close to DG Enterprise and the chemicals industry, 
leading to conflicts of interest and bias.  
 
7.4 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
 
Established in 2005 and situated in Solna, Sweden, the ECDC’s mission is to “identify, assess 
and communicate current and emerging threats to human health posed by infectious diseases“ 
(ECDC 2014). The agency provides the European Commission and the member states with 
scientific opinions and information on public health, coordinates the cooperation of national 
disease canters, and facilitates exchange of best practices. The agency had originally been 
established as a means to harmonise and manage a variety of different Commission networks 
that had already been existent in the member states since 1994. This also includes the 
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development of one "standardised, harmonised" EU method of disease data collection (ECDC 
External Evaluation). In 
general, the Centre’s 
Executive Director reports to 
the management board, 
which includes 
representatives from the 
member states, the 
Commission, and Parliament. 
Up to now, the ECDC has 
had two Executive Directors 
until now with Zsuzsanna 
Jakab and Marc Sprenger. 
 
7.4.1. Informal Autonomy 
 
The ECDC was one of the first decentralised agencies to implement Activity Based 
Management in its budgeting procedures at the insistence of both the Commission and the 
member states, in order to increase the accountability of the Centre (Interview Member 
Management Bard ECDC). However, several problems appeared in its implementation, 
especially regarding the use of indicators for measuring the effectiveness of certain projects. 
Indeed, this issue led to such conflicts between the agency and the Commission that the latter 
did not approve the work programme, which “would have meant no money and no staff 
salaries for this year…resulted in a lot of work and discussion between agency and 
commission (ibid). This conflict is also exasperated by the overall scarcity of resources and 
the cuts to the European Union budget that also affect the agency.  
The external evaluation from 2008 mentions difficulties in the working of the 
management board, especially “a tendency that part of the MB members are focussing more 
on operational activities than on issues of strategic relevance. With regard to input from the 
MS during meetings, it is observed that new MS representatives are less active than other 
members. This can be explained by the fact that a few MS representatives seem to dominate 
the meetings” (ECORYS, 2008, p. 77). The same dynamics are also described by the 
interview respondents: “national interests are definitely represented…do we sit here to fight 
diseases or fight over competences?” (Interview Member Management Board ECDC). In 
addition, representatives are mostly not scientists or have a background in health research; 
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instead they are lawyers and politicians, which means that they are inherently more 
comfortable in discussions about political issues.  
As a response to the Common Approach and scarcer resources, a new financial 
framework was developed. It stipulates that the work programme and budget have to be 
approved by the European Commission before the Management Board gets the opportunity to 
discuss them (Interview Commission Official 1). However, this increase in control also has an 
effect on the scientific work of the agency. The Centre’s agenda is mostly developed in 
reaction to current health crises; the agency’s priorities can shift very quickly and radically. 
Now, that “the drafting of work programmes and financial budgeting become stricter and 
Commission wants to know everything even earlier” more time needs to be spent on 
synchronising the different annual and multi-annual work programmes, as well as 
coordinating between management board and advisory forum (Interview Management Board 
ECDC). 
Concerning the two tasks of risk assessment and risk communication included in the 
agency’s mandate, both leave space for interpretation. Thus, “the border between risk 
assessment and risk management is sometimes difficult to determine” (ibid). Especially those 
member states, which do not have the resources, demand not only scientific advice but also 
suggestions for concrete action from the ECDC that they then can implement. In addition, it is 
unclear if risk communication to the public is the task of ECDC or the member states. As one 
member of the management board formulates it, there is “always difference between the tasks 
of the centre on paper and what the member states want them to do” (ibid.). Especially with 
the new financial constraints on staff and budget, the competences of the Centre might be 
interpreted more freely. An example is the new Directive on serious health threats, where the 
“ECDC plays almost a secretarial role in risk management” (Interview Member Management 
Board ECDC) without any official acknowledgment of the new role or additional resources.  
 
7.4.2. Reputation Building 
 
When looking at the general picture, the ECDC has an excellent reputation, as evidenced by 
the surveys published in the external evaluation (2008) and the popularity of the scientific 
journal ‘Eurosurveillance’ that is published by the agency. The European Commission is the 
Centre’s most important partner and many of its tasks directly benefit the Commission, thus 
their satisfaction is also high: “ECDC has built a very strong reputation in a number of its 
outputs…in core competences, ECDC actually stands firm” (Interview Commission Official 
1). The relations with the member states are mostly a result of the Centre’s history. 
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Established as a way to coordinate the 18 disease-specific networks and to continue funding 
of these networks, the member state’s research institutes play a large role in the agency’s day-
to-day activities. Apparently, there has been opposition to the establishment of ECDC, as 
networks were afraid to lose autonomy and funding (Interview Management Board ECDC). 
However, the new situation has been accepted very quickly, both by the member states and 
the public. Thus, early newspaper articles laud especially the Centre’s effectiveness in 
responding to new health threats and diseases: “when governments agreed to set up a 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in 2004, few expected it to play such a 
high-profile role in EU policies so quickly” (European Voice, 31-10-2007). In general, the 
media analysis shows a very neutral of the agency, with articles using ECDC’s scientific 
opinions but almost no focus on the Centre and its activities itself. Furthermore, another 
consequence of such a relatively decentralised agency is the fact that “the EU part is often 
weakly addressed in the centre” (Interview Commission Official 1), with the Centre having to 
draw heavily on the member states’ willingness and capability to cooperate. As another result, 
it is rather difficult for other actors to assess the agency’s exact impact and contribution to the 
functioning of the networks (ibid), as well as anticipate future tasks or needs of the agency: 
“we are now internally at a very stable point…but there are external influences…and we are 
almost completely influenced from the outside” (Interview Member Management Board 
ECDC). 
The relations between member states occur along familiar fault lines, especially 
between smaller and larger countries. A member of the agency’s management board remarks 
that larger member states and especially those with a federal structure, represent very strict 
interests and mandates in the agency, leaving them less flexible in discussions. On the other 
hand, smaller countries do not have the competence at home and thus focus more on content 
and science (Interview Management Board ECDC). However, these conflicts also make it 
necessary for the Commission (or give them the possibility) to take the lead in the agency, 
taking advantage of differences in national interests (ibid). In these dynamics, the Executive 
Director plays an important role. He has two main tasks: first, he has to represent the agency 
politically to the outside, lobbying the institutions and member states. Second, he needs to 
motivate a staff made up of very diverse specialists and top researchers, always balancing the 
political and scientific: “our first director was very good at the political…our current director 
did have administrative experience but knows especially about the content…even if you 
follow the rules, the communication style is incredibly important…the director not only 
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represents the agency to the outside but also has to keep it, this group of brilliant, very 
competent people, together” (ibid). 
 
Figure 10: Criticism of ECDC in EP Questions 
 
The past Directors seem to have built a good relationship with the European Parliament as 
well, considering the results of the parliamentary questions’ analysis. The ECDC is mentioned 
in the questions rarely anyway, and only very few questions contain criticisms. They focus on 
problems and delays with specific projects, with on question including complaints about 
coordination with the World Health Organisation in combating polio in Syria. Nevertheless, 
across all years and party lines, ECDC enjoys an excellent reputation in the European 
Parliament. 
All of this means that the ECDC has managed to develop some informal autonomy, 
acquiring new tasks and competences outside of its initial mandate. Furthermore, the Centre 
enjoys an excellent reputation for unbiased information in the scientific community, as well as 
for effective coordination in the member states. These analyses of the four cases are now 
connected with each other and to wider-reaching developments in the European Union in the 
following chapter.  
 
8. Discussion  
The four agencies under discussion have evolved very differently since their foundation. 
However, can processes of institutionalisation or the multi-principals framework explain these 
developments? This question is dealt with in this part, also taking into account external 
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factors that have not been part of the discussion above. Furthermore, it connects them to the 
creation of the Common Approach to Decentralised Agencies. This document has been long 
in the making, with the first communication starting in 2002 under pressure from the 
European Parliament. In 2005, the draft for an inter-institutional agreement was written and 
then rejected by the Council of the European Union. The final version was then published in 
2012. In the following, its implications for the agencies’ autonomy are discussed.  
Formally, the financial autonomy of EU agencies is very low. Although the agencies 
draft and implement their own budget, it remains part of the EU’s general budget. Thus, the 
European Commission, the Parliament and the member states have to approve. However, 
especially many members of management boards have cited agencies’ tendencies to hide 
important facts in masses of complex, unstructured data, making it difficult to ascertain the 
real costs and needs of the organisation. In order to counteract this development, the Common 
Approach (2012) suggests the introduction of Activity-Based Costing or Management (art. 
32). This method is supposed to be more accurate by exactly linking staff activities and 
projects to the budget. It should result in better accountability and easier control. About a 
third of the agencies’ founding acts have already been changed to incorporate this principle 
and the way budgets and work programmes are written has been altered  (Interview European 
Commission Official 2). Among the four agencies considered here, the ECDC is the only one 
that has completely taken over ABM, while ECHA and EMSA have adopted it partly. 
Activity-Based Costing is not without its opponents, criticism focuses especially on the role 
of indirect costs and problems in implementation: “it is the more creative least routine staff 
activities, those which least fit its framework of accountability, which are under most threat” 
(Armstrong, 2002, p. 117). Similar criticisms can also be heard in EU agencies, as some of 
their tasks (coordination, dissemination, scientific research) are difficult to quantify or be 
expressed in objectively measurable indicators.  
As a consequence, this is also supposed to strengthen the position of the management 
board and make them more effective in controlling their agencies. Though studying different 
decentralised agencies, the research for this paper overall confirms Busioc’s (2012) claim that 
“some board delegations fall short of adequately holding directors to account and 
comprehensively assessing significant aspects of agencies’ performance that fall within their 
supervisory mandates and which thus escape oversight” (p. 734). The interviews show that 
there is a definite link between the work of the management board and the work of the agency 
(Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). All agencies attempt to spin the 
information they give their management boards to their advantage. However, it seems the 
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more the interests are united on the board and the better they work together, the better the 
agency’s reputation is. The Common Approach suggests one representative per member state 
with a balance between technical and managerial expertise, as well as the introduction of an 
executive board. However, the EFSA, for example, has a management board of independent 
experts and EMSA is the only agency in this sample that has introduced an executive 
committee. According to a Commission official, the number of members on the management 
does not make a difference to an agency’s effectiveness (Interview European Commission 
Official 2).  
However, members of the advisory forum at EFSA argue that the current structure 
disadvantages the member states’ considerably in favour of the European Commission. In 
general, there is a definite imbalance between the Commission and the member states, also 
regarding horizontal issues and coordination. The European Commission has established a 
specific unit for coordination with the decentralised agencies that also organises meetings of 
Commission representatives, encourages the exchange of best practices and information 
(Interview European Commission Official 2). The European Commission claims special 
ownership of and responsibility for these agencies, with some officials considering the 
agencies not as more than extended Directorate-Generals (Interview Commission Official 1). 
There is nothing similar in the member states. National governments and administrations do 
not seem to be very interested in what their representatives are doing: “I’m really surprised 
how little accountability management board members have to their own constituents…there is 
no national position” (Interview Member Management Board ECHA). Even if meetings do 
take place, they are “however without substantial results…member state representatives do 
not have the resources” (Interview Member Administrative Board EMSA). 
The last aspect where agencies can gain de-facto autonomy is the interpretation of 
their mandates. They may take advantage of a vaguely formulated mandate like in the case of 
EFSA or try to influence the drafting process of their work programmes as much as possible. 
Sometimes, the limit between different tasks is indefinable, like the differentiation between 
risk assessment and risk management. Where do one stop and the other begin? However, the 
extension of strategic autonomy also shows that informal autonomy does not have to mean 
agency drift. In fact, almost all examples in this paper of agencies developing autonomy have 
taken place with the (sometimes grudging) permission of their principals. In many cases, 
member states let the agency have more autonomy in certain areas because they do not have 
sufficient resources for adequate control. However, many representatives have made it clear 
that they only allow this to happen as long as the agency fulfils its role effectively, often 
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trusting the Commission to manage the agency instead and hoping that they will hear of 
criticism from other sources. On the other hand, the Commission uses the agencies also as 
means to further its own spheres of influence and are deeply involved in all agencies’ day-to-
day activities.  
How does this relate to agency reputation? The first aspect of reputation building is 
the maintenance of a perception of independent scientific advice, relate to reputational 
uniqueness. This is especially addressed by the conflict-of-interests policy of the agencies. 
The case of EFSA and the resulting public outrage, as well as pressures by Parliament and 
NGOs led to the overhaul of the policies in all agencies, no matter if there had been problems 
or not (Interview European Commission Official 2). Thus, EMSA for example strengthened 
its conflict-of-interests policy, although there were no complaints by the European 
Ombudsman and conflicts of interests are very unlikely in the agency’s field of work  
(Interview European Commission Official 3). This demand for more transparency and 
accountability has also been reinforced by the scarcity of resources caused by the economic 
crisis, a recurring topic in the interviews conducted. As one Commission official formulated 
it, “agencies have to prove that they don’t exist for the sake of existing” (Interview European 
Commission Official 2). Scrutiny has become more important but also more complicated, as 
both national authorities and agencies like EFSA and ECHA outsource parts of their 
activities, especially scientific research (Interview Member Advisory Forum EFSA 1). 
A second aspect of reputation building is the creation of support networks and diverse 
coalitions, summarised under political multiplicity. This is especially crucial in the context of 
the European Union with its variety of actors, interacting at different levels. The institutional 
set-up of EU agencies demands balancing between different interests. All interviewees agree 
that the personality of the director is decisive to this balancing act. Thus, the Common 
Approach also attempts to draw up guidelines on tailored performance indicators to assess the 
results achieved by Directors. Unfortunately, these have not been published yet, also because 
the inter-institutional working group is struggling to come to an agreement on this. However, 
they should be finished at the end of 2014. There are several roles an Executive Director has 
to fulfil, ranging from managerial aspects of his work (staff motivation) over the technical 
(scientific understanding) to the political, when lobbying the EU institutions and member 
states (Interview European Commission Official 2). Directors become part of the very 
complex European Union system, with its own rules and mechanisms. Especially in the 
Commission respondents are thus keen on candidates who know how to play the game, to an 
extent that member state representatives also involved in the selection might not be aware: “a 
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requirement which is often forgotten: in our view, someone who leads an agency should have 
some understanding of the EU system…it is not seen the same way by the member states! 
[…] On the EU side, if you are not aware of the mechanisms, you might be in serious troubles 
as an agency“ (Interview Commission Official 1). 
The European Parliament has become an important part of this system, as they have to 
discharge the agencies’ budgets, meet their Directors and sometimes give a voice to NGOs 
another interests that otherwise would not reach the agencies.  
 
Figure 11: European Parliament on EU Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph shows a marked difference between agencies, who invite quite a lot of attention 
and criticism, like EFSA, and those, who just work quietly in the background (EMSA or 
ECDC). The latter are assumed to be effective at what they are doing and thus also not as 
much in the public eye, as already the analysis of media coverage shows. The general results 
of the analysis of the agencies’ autonomy and reputation are summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 3: Schematisation of the Overall Results 
Two cases lend evidence to the idea that the two hypotheses are complementary. The 
European Food Safety Authority has both a low number of principals and a low reputation, 
Table 3: Overall Results
Agency Number of Principals Reputation Informal Autonomy
European Food Safety Authority low low low
European Chemicals Agency high low low
European Maritime Safety Agency low high high
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control high high high
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thus displaying low levels of autonomy. On the other hand, the ECDC is controlled by a high 
number of principals and displays a very good reputation, leading to high levels of autonomy. 
However, the outliers are the European Chemicals Agency with its low informal autonomy 
and EMSA with its high one. There are several explanations for these results.  
First of all, the Common Approach has been developed to a large degree as a response 
to allegations that conflicts of interest are not taken seriously in EFSA and that there needs to 
better control of what is happening overall at agencies. Next to EFSA, ECHA is the only 
agency in this sample that has faced similar (though not as serious as EFSA) allegations, thus 
leading to more serious changes through the Common Approach. Second, although the 
management board has a high number of members, it does not display the proportionate level 
of conflict. The multi-principals literature just assumes that the level of conflict rises with the 
number of principals. However, this is not necessarily the case. Especially the member state 
delegations on ECHA’s board are largely apathetic. This only leaves the conflict between 
very few active members and the Commission, which takes place in all agencies. On the other 
hand, EMSA’s board might have fewer members but there are several conflicts taking place, 
both between member states (the North Sea-Mediterranean divide) but some member states 
like Germany have even been completely against the agency’s existence at the beginning. 
Third, ECHA suffers not only from a bad reputation but it has also failed to lobby the 
European Parliament effectively and the member states, thus not influencing the relations 
between principals themselves. Instead, ECHA has chosen to align itself completely with the 
European Commission, leaving the member states frustrated at their uncooperative behaviour. 
On the other hand, EMSA has made huge efforts to engage all of its stake-holders, by trying 
to increase effectiveness and draw the member states in, as well as very effectively lobbying 
the European Parliament. With the EP, the agency thus drew a principal on its side that could 
have been largely absent in discussions of the agency’s autonomy as in the case of ECHA.  
This discussion also shows how necessary an evolutionary perspective on the 
development of autonomy is. When analysing de-facto autonomy, a long-term view on 
institutional changes and relationships between actors is essential. Building a reputation takes 
time and even with a very good reputation autonomy is not granted automatically. In fact, the 
autonomy of all agencies under consideration here has been limited to a certain degree over 
the last year as a consequence of the economic situation. However, some agencies have 
curtailed more than others. It seems that in situations where resources are scarce, delegation 
continues if already a relationship of trust has been developed. Considering the lack of 
information from which the principals (and especially the member states) suffer, reputation is 
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the next best indicator for a continuation of the initial arrangements. Conflicts between 
principals play an important role in the process, as the initial analysis has shown that agencies 
do not gain informal autonomy in secret. De-facto autonomy is as much a result of 
negotiations between principals as the initial formal autonomy. The difference for the former 
lies in the fact that the agency is now an actor as well, influencing the relationships between 
principals through gathering political support and building a reputation for effectiveness and 
delivering good work. 
 
9. Conclusions  
Agencies have become a popular organisational type in the European Union, with their 
exponentially increasing over the last thirty years. However, while much research has 
focussed on the foundation of agencies, as well as the initial delegation of tasks to them, now 
might be good time to also consider their evolution after the establishment. Thus, I have 
studied four agencies (European Food Safety Authority, European Chemicals Agency, 
European Maritime Safety Agency, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control). 
and their development over the last decade. This research was motivated by two questions. 
First, I attempted to study the empirical evidence: In how far have European agencies evolved 
beyond their formal decision-making powers? The interviews with Management Board 
members and Commission officials reveal that EU agencies have developed a level of 
informal autonomy beyond the initial delegation of powers. However, this has not happened 
to the degree that some authors in the literature on EU agencies have assumed. There is 
certainly little evidence that agencies act behind the backs of their principals, experiencing 
some form of agency drift. Instead, their de-facto autonomy evolves mostly with the support 
of one or all of their principals.  
However, if this is the case, what factors explain these differences in autonomy 
between agencies? I have drawn on two theoretical approaches. First, the popular principal-
agent framework, and more specifically the multi-principals model, assumes that the more 
principals an agency has, the larger is the difference between its de jure and de facto 
autonomy. Second, institutionalism focuses on the reputation of agencies, as the more positive 
an agency’s reputation is, the larger is the difference between its de jure and de facto 
autonomy. The analysis shows that these two hypotheses might well be complementary. On 
the one hand, agencies do engage in reputation building. They employ media strategies, lobby 
the European Parliament, gather support in the member states, and want to show how 
effective they are. The cases show that some agencies (e.g. EMSA) are more successful than 
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others (e.g. EFSA), thus influencing the perception of the principals and their willingness to 
grant the agency further autonomy. However, conflicts between principals still play a role, 
although the number of principals may not be a good indicator. As the agencies in question 
have not gone rogue but instead still depend on the principals’ decisions, these negotiations 
could have a strong explanatory power. Nevertheless, in these cases, reputation seems to 
explain slightly more but that might also be because of the special situation of the economic 
crisis. With budget cuts and the development of the Common Approach to Decentralised 
Agencies, Commission, European Parliament and member states seem to have become less 
willing to grant agencies autonomy, neither formal nor informal. Overall, the research shows 
that delegation and autonomy are ongoing processes, where the agent is more than a passive 
actor receiving competences. Instead, EU agencies are able to show that they are effective and 
that they can offer solutions that no other organisations can. Thus, when autonomy is re-
negotiated, as it is constantly, this reputation also informs the principals’ decision. 
Furthermore, the indicator for the multi-principle framework does not seem to work for 
informal autonomy in the same way as in studies of legal autonomy. In further research, 
instead of the number of principals, some other measurement for conflict between principals 
might prove to be more helpful. 
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